The Constitutionality of Prolonged Administrative Segregation for Inmates Who Have Received Sex Reassignment Surgery by Fleischaker, Eric T.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 41
Number 4 Summer 2014 Article 5
1-1-2014
The Constitutionality of Prolonged Administrative
Segregation for Inmates Who Have Received Sex
Reassignment Surgery
Eric T. Fleischaker
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric T. Fleischaker, The Constitutionality of Prolonged Administrative Segregation for Inmates Who Have Received Sex Reassignment
Surgery, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 903 (2014).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol41/iss4/5
The Constitutionality of Prolonged
Administrative Segregation for Inmates Who
Have Received Sex Reassignment Surgery
by ERIC T. FLEISCHAKER*
Introduction
In 2012, a Massachusetts district court judge issued a
controversial decision in Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II)' when he
ordered the state to pay for a transgender 2 inmate's sex reassignment
surgery.3 The decision is controversial for two reasons: First, the
court ordered the state to fund a surgery for a prisoner that Medicare
or Medicaid would not cover for an unincarcerated person. Secondly,
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1. Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012). See also
Associated Press, Convicted killer sues state for free sex change, NBCNEWS.COM (May 31,
2006, 5:15 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/13068147/ns/usnews-weirdnews/t/convicted-
killer-sues-state-free-sex-change/#.UQXBel7A9UQ; Wendy Kaminer, Is Denying Treatment




An umbrella term ... for people whose gender identity and/or gender
expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. The term
may include but is not limited to: transsexuals, cross-dressers and other
gender-variant people. Transgender people may identify as female-to-
male (FTM) or male-to-female (MTF). Use the descriptive term
(transgender, transsexual, cross-dresser, FTM or MTF) preferred by the
individual. Transgender people may or may not decide to alter their
bodies hormonally and/or surgically.
GLAAD Media Reference Guide-Transgender Glossary of Terms, GLAAD, http://www.
glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Apr. 14, 2013)
3. "Refers to surgical alteration, and is only one small part of transition....
Preferred term to 'sex change operation."' Id.
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the decision left open the question about what to do with the inmate
after the operation. The court decided not to address the second
issue, finding that it was not yet ripe.4
Finding for the plaintiff, the court utilized a five-step Eighth
Amendment test to determine when an inmate has a constitutional
right to medical services or care,' and found that the state has a duty
to provide a transgender prisoner with sex reassignment surgery.' In
so finding, the court opened the door to the extent of this duty.' The
court explained that the question of the constitutionality of Kosilek's
placement in isolation in the men's prison for an indeterminate
amount of time, even if done for her protection, was not yet ripe.
This Note continues this analysis by first discussing whether the issue
is in fact ripe. Then, ripeness notwithstanding, this Note analyzes the
constitutionality of placing Kosilek in solitary confinement for an
indeterminate period of time-even if done for her safety.
I. The Factual and Procedural Background of Kosilek II
Michelle Kosilek suffers from Gender Identity Disorder.! She'o
was born "Robert"-a boy-and from the time she was ten years old
she felt she was a woman trapped inside a man's body." Because of
her condition, Kosilek abused drugs and took female hormones when
she had access. 2
4. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 243-44.
5. Id. at 200.
6. Id. at 250-51.
7. See id. at 243-44.
8. Id.
9. Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek 1), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002).
"Gender Identity Disorder" is
A controversial ... diagnosis given to transgender and other gender-
variant people. Because it labels people as "disordered," Gender
Identity Disorder is often considered offensive. The diagnosis is
frequently given to children who don't conform to expected gender
norms in terms of dress, play or behavior. Such children are often
subjected to intense psychotherapy, behavior modification andlor
institutionalization. Replaces the outdated term'gender dysphoria.'
GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE-TRANSGENDER GLOSSARY OF TERMS, supra note 2.
10. While court documents and the state of Massachusetts use "he" and "him" in
referring to Kosilek, this Note uses pronouns that align with the subject's self-
identification.
11. Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
12. Id.
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Her desire to become a woman led to frequent physical and
mental abuse. Her stepfather stabbed her when she told her family
about her feelings. 4 In the early 1970s, Kosilek took female
hormones and developed breasts." During this period, Kosilek was
briefly imprisoned and gang raped twice during her incarceration.1
Two men at a gay bar also beat her because of her desire to become a
woman. 7  Despite the abuse, Kosilek never sought professional
treatment for her condition.'8
Kosilek eventually entered a drug rehabilitation facility." There,
she met Cheryl McCaul, a volunteer counselor at the facility, who
told Kosilek that a "good woman" would cure her transsexualism.20
The two later married.2' One day McCaul came home and found
Kosilek in women's clothing.22 McCaul became angry and began to
fight Kosilek, who strangled McCaul to death.2 In 1992, Kosilek was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole.24
In prison, Kosilek took female hormones that she purchased
illegally. 25 Due to her mental anguish, she tried to kill herself twice
and even attempted to castrate herself.26
In 2000, the Massachusetts Department of Corrections ("DOC")
adopted a blanket policy regarding the treatment of transsexual
prisoners.27 The policy dictated that transsexual prisoners would
receive the same treatment they were receiving at the time of their
incarceration.28 Since Kosilek illegally obtained hormonal treatment





17. Id. at 163.
18. Id. at 163-M4.





24. Id. at 214; Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2002).
25. Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
26. Id. at 158.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 159-60.
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for her gender identity disorder despite the severity of her
symptoms.2 9
Kosilek brought suit challenging the DOC's policy and decision
to withhold treatment as violations of the Eighth Amendment.0 In
Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), the court explained that the Eighth
Amendment does not permit the unnecessary infliction of pain on a
prisoner, either intentionally or because of the deliberate indifference
of the responsible prison official." The district court ruled against
Kosilek, finding that she did not prove the DOC's failure to provide
adequate care was because of deliberate indifference.32
Subsequently, in 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a state statute prohibiting hormone therapy and sex reassignment
surgery for any prisoner violated the Eighth Amendment because the
statute constituted deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious
medical needs. In addition, the DOC changed commissioners and
Kosilek started receiving hormone treatment and psychotherapy.
Under the new commissioner, DOC doctors adopted the
standards of care generally accepted by the psychological community:
the "Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender,
and Gender-Nonconforming People" ("Standards of Care")."
Following these Standards of Care, the doctors concluded that
Kosilek required a sex reassignment surgery to treat her gender
identity disorder." Kosilek had already tried to kill and castrate
herself, and the doctors explained that her symptoms would only
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 161.
32. Id. at 195.
33. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 2011) (cited in Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp.
2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012)).
34. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
35. Id. at 197 n.1. See E. Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of
Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT'L J. OF
TRANSGENDERISM 165, 165 (2011) (The World Professional Association for Transgender
Health publishes the Standards of Care "to provide clinical guidance for health
professionals to assist transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people with
safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting personal comfort with their gendered
selves, in order to maximize their overall health, psychological well-being, and self-
fulfillment.").
36. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (DOC Commissioner Dennehy testified in 2006
that she understood and accepted the DOC doctors' view that "Kosilek is at substantial
risk of serious harm and that sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment.").
906 [Vol. 41:4
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worsen unless she received the operation.37 The DOC commissioner,
Kathleen Dennehy, acknowledged that she understood and accepted
the doctors' conclusion, but denied Kosilek the sex reassignment
surgery because the treatment would create insurmountable security
problems.
Kosilek sued again to challenge the DOC's refusal to provide her
with adequate treatment." She asserted that the DOC violated her
Eighth Amendment right by refusing to provide the medical
treatment necessary for her well being and that such violation would
continue until a court orders the DOC to provide her prescribed
treatment."
II. The Court's Five-Step Test to Assess Kosilek's Eighth
Amendment Challenge
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments."4' The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eighth Amendment proscription on cruel and unusual punishment to
protect prisoners from the unnecessary infliction of pain by prison
officials.42  The infliction of pain rises to the level of "cruel and
unusual" when it results from an intentional act or "deliberate
indifference" to a prisoner's medical needs.43  For neglect of a
prisoner's medical needs to qualify, it must be intentional and
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind."" Inadvertent or negligent
malpractice does not rise to a constitutional violation simply because
the patient is a prisoner.45
Prisoners do, however, have a constitutional right to adequate
health care.46  While there is no general constitutional right to
adequate health care, prisoners have such a right because of the
unique circumstances of incarceration:




41. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
42. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
43. Id. at 104-05.
44. Id. at 105 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)).
45. Id. at 106.
46. Id. at 103.
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To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means
to provide for their own needs. Prisoners are
dependent on the State for food, clothing, and
necessary medical care. A prison's failure to provide
sustenance for inmates may actually produce physical
torture or a lingering death. Just as a prisoner may
starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not
provided adequate medical care. A prison that
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the
concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized
society.47
In Kosilek II, the district court crafted a five-prong test relying
on prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.48 The test analyzed
whether a prison official exhibited deliberate indifference towards an
inmate's medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment.49 In
order to succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference, an inmate must
show that: (1) she has a serious medical need; (2) the treatment
sought is the only adequate treatment; (3) the DOC knows that the
inmate is at a high risk of harm if she does not receive the treatment
sought; (4) the DOC denied the treatment not because of any good
faith, reasonable security concerns, or for any other legitimate
penological purposes; and (5) the DOC's unconstitutional conduct
will continue in the future."o
A. The First Prong: Is There a Serious Medical Need?
The first thing that an inmate must show to succeed on an Eighth
Amendment claim is the presence of a serious medical need." Courts
have found a serious medical need through evidence of a substantial
risk of serious harm if the medical condition is not adequately
treated.52
47. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
48. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (D. Mass. 2012).
49. Id. at 229.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("A 'serious' medical need exists if the failure to
treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))).
908 [Vol. 41:4
Summer 20141 SEGREGATION AFTER SEX REASSIGNMENT
In determining whether a condition rises to the level of a serious
medical need the court may consider any relevant factors including
whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the medical
need in question as "important and worthy of comment or
treatment," whether the medical condition significantly affects daily
activities, and "the existence of chronic and substantial pain."" A
physician's notice that the medical need mandates treatment is a good
indication of a serious medical need.54 However, such diagnosis is not
always necessary as the harm may be so obvious that even a layperson
would recognize the necessity of a doctor's attention."
Additionally, a serious medical need is not limited to physical
ailments." An inmate's psychological condition could rise to the level
of a serious medical need if it subjects the inmate to a substantial risk
of harm if the condition is not adequately treated. However,
whether the injury from a mental illness is sufficiently severe to meet
this standard may be difficult to determine because the symptoms can
be less obvious than physical ailments." In such cases, it is especially
important to rely on a doctor's diagnosis or the outward
manifestations of the mental illness.59
Under this standard, the district court found that Kosilek's
condition constituted a serious medical need.? Following the decision
in Kosilek I, gender identity specialist Dr. Seil evaluated Kosilek on
53. Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong,
143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)).
54. Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995).
55. Id. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) ("a factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious"); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998):
A prisoner who nicks himself shaving obviously does not have a
constitutional right to cosmetic surgery. But if prison officials
deliberately ignore the fact that a prisoner has a five-inch gash on his
cheek that is becoming infected, the failure to provide appropriate
treatment might well violate the Eighth Amendment. Compare Arce
v. Banks, 913 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (small cyst-like
growth on forehead not sufficiently serious), with Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1373-74 (7th Cir. 1997) (large cyst that had become
infected was a serious medical condition).
Id.
56. Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991).
57. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
58. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 213 (D. Mass. 2012).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 229.
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behalf of the DOC." Using the Standards of Care, Dr. Seil diagnosed
Kosilek as suffering from gender identity disorder.62 Dr. Seil pointed
to the outward manifestations of Kosilek's condition-the suicide and
mutilation attempts-and explained that Kosilek is at risk of serious
harm because of her condition.63 Therefore, the district court was
correct to find that Kosilek's condition was a serious medical need.
B. The Second Prong: Is the Treatment Sought the Only Adequate
Treatment?
Under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate is entitled to adequate
care-not necessarily ideal care." Prisons are unique settings and
ideal treatment may not be available because of cost, feasibility, or
other factors. Outside of prison, medical treatment is not always
available on an equal basis-sometimes better treatment costs more
money." Just because a person is in prison does not entitle them to
the best care money can buy. As stated by the Second Circuit, "[s]o
long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might
prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation.""
Adequate care is subject to a reasonableness standard.' Such
care must be "at a level reasonably commensurate with modern
medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent
professional standards."" For individuals with gender identity
61. Id. at 218.
62. Id.
63. According to a gender disorder specialist who evaluated Kosilek, "[i]f
transitioning to female is not within her control, she may take control of the situation by
ending her own life." Id.
64. United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[I]t is plain that an
inmate deserves adequate medical care.") (emphasis omitted). See also Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) ("The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punishments."'); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 349 (1981) (explaining that the Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons").
65. See DeCologero, 821 F.2d at 43-44.
66. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 125 (Brian D. Smedley, et al. eds., 2009).
67. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). In Chance, a dentist
provided by the prison recommended that an inmate have two teeth pulled to treat his
overbite and a cavity. Id. at 701. Based on a letter from a different dentist, the inmate
wanted a filling instead of having his teeth pulled but the correctional officials ignored his
request. Id. The inmate alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 700.
68. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190,230 (D. Mass. 2012).
69. DeCologero, 821 F.2d at 43.
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disorder, the Standards of Care are generally considered the
benchmark for what constitutes adequate care.70
Sex reassignment surgery was the only adequate treatment for
Kosilek.n All but one of the doctors who testified in Kosilek II
agreed that sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek was both medically
necessary and the only adequate treatment for her gender identity
disorder.72 The only doctor who disagreed does not practice in
accordance with the Standards of Care.73 The evidence showed that
antidepressants and psychotherapy would not eliminate Kosilek's
mental anguish or the risk of serious harm.74 Therefore, the district
court was correct to find that sex reassignment surgery was the only
adequate treatment.
C. The Third Prong: Is the DOC Aware of and Disregarding Excessive
Risk to the Inmate's Health or Safety?
The mens rea of "deliberate indifference" lies between
negligence and purposeful or knowing." The Supreme Court
explicitly discussed the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer
v. Brennan:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harms exists, and he must also draw the
inference."
70. Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Mass. 2002). See also O'Donnabhain v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34, 65-67 (2010) (The United States Tax Court
relied on the "Standards of Care" to determine that the Internal Revenue Service's
disallowance of a medical expense deduction for hormone therapy and sex reassignment
surgery was improper.).
71. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (D. Mass. 2012).
72. Id. at 233.
73. Id. at 232.
74. Id. at 236.
75. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
76. Id. at 837.
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It follows that for there to be an Eight Amendment violation, an
official must first perceive of the risk of serious harm. The test for
deliberate indifference is subjective."
However, an objective perspective is not wholly absent from the
test for deliberate indifference." Whether an official is aware of a
serious medical need is a question of fact for the usual fact finders."
The jury can determine that an injury or significant risk may be so
obvious that the official must have had actual knowledge of the risk,
thus factoring into the jury's determination of the official's level of
awareness.
One complication that may arise lies is identifying the official
who owes a duty towards the inmate." The Eighth Amendment
imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement to inmates, which includes adequate medical care.82
However, prison officials are likely not trained to properly evaluate
whether an inmate is at risk of serious harm, and they may have a
duty to seek outside guidance from medical specialists.83 In such cases
where an official seeks outside guidance from a medical specialist, the
prison official may have satisfied the duty to the inmate, and the
liability then shifts to the medical specialist to properly determine
whether the inmate is at risk of serious harm.'
Once the inmate shows that a prison official was aware of the
harm, the inmate must then show that the official failed to act
reasonably.85 A prison official who acts reasonably in attempting to
ameliorate an inmate's risk of harm is not liable even if the harm
ultimately resulted."
Following Kosilek I, the new DOC commissioner, Dennehy,
sought the opinion of a gender identity disorder specialist from the
University of Massachusetts to assess Kosilek's condition.' The
specialist agreed with the previous assessments and advised
77. Id.
78. See id. at 842-43.
79. Id. at 842.
80. Id. at 842-43.
81. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 237 (D. Mass. 2012).
82. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
83. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (D. Mass. 2012).
84. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
85. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45.
86. Id.
87. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 237-39.
912 [Vol. 41:4
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Commissioner Dennehy that Kosilek suffered from a severe case of
gender identity disorder and was at a serious risk of harm." Both
Commissioner Dennehy and the specialist acknowledged that they
were aware of the risk of harm to Kosilek." Commissioner Dennehy
also acknowledged that she did nothing to prevent the harm to
Kosilek, but contended that her denial of Kosilek's need for surgery
was justified in light of security concerns.' This brings us to the
fourth prong of the Eight Amendment analysis.
D. The Fourth Prong: Was the Treatment Denied Because of Good
Faith, Reasonable Security Concerns?
While inmates' health is a concern, prison officials' duty to
maintain order and safety in an environment as volatile as a prison
cannot be understated." A prison official must sometimes juggle the
duties to some inmates against the security concerns, interests, or
safety of other inmates. The court noted that "medical 'need' in real
life is an elastic term: security considerations also matter at prisons or
civil counterparts, and administrators have to balance conflicting
demands.... [S]o long as the balancing judgments are within the
realm of reason and made in good faith, the officials' actions are not
'deliberate indifference' ... ."9 Thus, if an official's decision to
withhold medical care from an inmate is justified by safety concerns,
the denial of care is not unreasonable and thus is not
unconstitutional.93
Whether the official acted in good faith requires a determination
of the official's subjective intent.9" Again, this subjective intent is a
question of fact for the fact finder and may be evidenced by the
official's behavior-indeed, "it is enough for the prisoner to show a
wanton disregard sufficiently evidenced by 'denial, delay, or
interference with prescribed health care."'95
In Kosilek II, the court determined that the DOC's reasons for




91. Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 2011)
92. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-45 (1994)).
93. Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 182 (D. Mass. 2002).
94. Battista, 645 F.3d at 453.
95. Id. (quoting DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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were, in fact, pretextual." Commissioner Dennehy fired the gender
identity specialist, Dr. Seil, after he advised that sex reassignment
surgery was the only adequate treatment for Kosilek." Commissioner
Dennehy then brought in a new specialist whom she knew opposed
sex reassignment surgeries."
Moreover, the DOC's argument that granting Kosilek's request
will set a precedent for other inmates to manipulate the prison system
by pretending to be in a similar situation as Kosilek is weak." Kosilek
is asking to have her genitalia removed. Any inmate pretending to be
similarly situated to Kosilek would be doing more than feigning an
illness to stay home from school-they would be making a significant,
life-changing sacrifice. The court felt that it was doubtful that an
inmate would make such a disingenuous sacrifice.'" The DOC's
security concerns were unsubstantiated and their actual reasons for
denying Kosilek treatment were personal and political."o' Therefore,
the district court correctly determined that the DOC did not deny the
surgery for good faith, reasonable security concerns.
E. The Fifth Prong: Will the Denial of Treatment Continue?
The courts are reluctant to issue injunctions against prison
officials; this is partially because of the unique settings of prison and
because it is assumed that prison officials know what is best for the
prison." Courts prefer to interfere only as a last resort, letting prison
officials handle prison issues.' Thus, if there is no indication that the
denial of treatment will persist, a court will refrain from issuing an
injunction.
The district court found that, without an injunction, the DOC
would continue to deny Kosilek the sex reassignment surgery."
Kosilek had to doggedly fight with the DOC for treatment, dating
96. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190,239-40 (D. Mass. 2012).
97. Id. at 240.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 241.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 247.
102. Id. at 248. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994) ("[A] district
court should approach issuance of injunctive orders with the usual caution, and may, for
example, exercise its discretion if appropriate by giving prison officials time to rectify the
situation before issuing an injunction.").
103. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (D. Mass. 2012).
104. Id. at 250.
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back to Kosilek I and her request for hormonal treatment.105
Moreover, the commissioner consistently ignored every doctor that
recommended sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek,'" and used
prison safety as a pretext.'" Based on the commissioner's delay, the
court inferred that without an injunction, Kosilek would not receive
the requisite treatment.1
The court found that Kosilek satisfied each of the five prongs,
and concluded that the DOC violated her Eighth Amendment right
to the only adequate treatment for her serious medical need."
Accordingly, the court issued an injunction ordering the DOC to
provide Kosilek with sex reassignment surgery.no
III. Prolonged Administrative Segregation for an Indeterminate
Sentence Violates the Eighth Amendment's Protection Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
While the court took an unprecedented step in Kosilek II by
ordering the state to pay for an inmate's sex reassignment surgery, it
also tried to keep the decision as narrowly tailored as possible."' The
court circumscribed its decision at receiving the surgery. The court
explicitly refused to detail any specific instructions as to who should
perform the surgery, or where it should be done."2 Furthermore, the
court refused to instruct on how the DOC should handle Kosilek's
incarceration after her surgery:
The DOC has the discretion to make good faith,
reasonable decisions concerning security .... If the
DOC decides that Kosilek must be segregated and
locked up 23 hours a day to reasonably assure his
safety, it is foreseeable that the court may be asked to
decide whether that decision is reasonable and made
105. Id. at 249.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 250.
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in good faith. That issue, however, is not now ripe for
resolution."'
Is the issue of what to do with Kosilek after her surgery actually
unripe? After all, potential harm can constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation."4 Indeed, the serious medical need that
satisfies the first prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis is a
substantial risk of serious harm. The Supreme Court has explained
that an inmate does not need to actually be injured before she can
seek a remedy; an unsafe life-threatening condition will suffice."'
Once Kosilek has her surgery, she will be a woman, at least
anatomically. It is not difficult to imagine the kind of harm that
awaits if she returns to a men's prison."' To have a substantial risk of
harm for Eighth Amendment purposes, it is not necessary to wait for
Kosilek to return to the men's prison after her surgery and see
whether she is raped or otherwise harmed.
Following the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, the
Department of Justice is required to compile and publish a report on
the incidence and effects for prison rape." The 2012 report indicates
that 9.6% of former inmates reported one or more incidents of sexual
victimization during their most recent period of incarceration."'
According to the report, among males who were bisexual, thirty-four
113. Id. at 250 (citation omitted).
114. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
115. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White noted:
That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates
is not a novel proposition.... It would be odd to deny an injunction to
inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in
their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.
The Courts of Appeals have plainly recognized that a remedy for
unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.").
Id.
116. See Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Fallacy (NBC television broadcast Apr.
18, 2003) (The episode centers around a murder at a party where a woman killed a young
man, claiming he was trying to rape her. As the investigation continues, Detectives
Benson and Stabler learn that the woman, Cheryl, is actually a biological man who is
taking hormones and planning a sex reassignment operation. Cheryl takes a plea deal, but
then decides to take her chances at trial when she discovers that the law requires her to be
housed with male inmates. She is convicted, sent to the male prison, and violently gang
raped within a few hours of incarceration.).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 15606(d) (2008).
118. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION ACT DATA COLLECTION ACIVITIES 1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.
gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4373.
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percent reported being sexually victimized by another inmate; among
males who were homosexual, thirty-nine percent reported being
victimized by another inmate."9 There are no statistics on anatomical
women in men's prisons, but with the number for homosexual males
as high as it is, one may assume that once Kosilek returns to the
men's prison after her surgery, she will be at a high risk of rape.
The district court in Kosilek II should have assessed the
constitutionality of the different placements for Kosilek post-sex
reassignment surgery. The act of being raped is certainly a serious
harm worthy of consideration in evaluating the first prong of the
deliberate indifference test. 20 For the court to have found the issue
unripe, it must have found that the likelihood of sexual assault is too
attenuated to constitute a substantial risk.' However, even if the
issue is not yet ripe for Kosilek, Kosilek II is merely the first in what
will likely be a series of cases dealing with inmates undergoing sex
reassignment surgeries and the litany of issues that attend such
situations. Therefore, it is prudent to assess the constitutionality of
the different placement options for inmates who undergo such an
operation.
The court in Kosilek II stated that it would not rule on placing
Kosilek in extended isolation, thus acknowledging that placing
Kosilek into general population at a male prison would not be
acceptable care.122 There are two types of isolation: punitive and
* 1231administrative segregation. Punitive segregation is used for
disciplinary measures; administrative segregation is used as a
protective device, either protecting the inmate from harm or
protecting others from the inmate.124 If Kosilek were placed in
isolation after surgery, it would be administrative segregation to
protect her from violence and sexual assault by other inmates. This
Note now examines whether it would be constitutional for Kosilek to
be placed in administrative isolation for twenty-three hours a day or
whether the Eighth Amendment demands that she be sent to a
women's facility.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) ("Being violently assaulted in prison
is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."') (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
121. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
122. Id.
123. GEOFFREY ALPERT, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 113 n.36 (1978).
124. Id.
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A. Spending Twenty-Three Hours Per Day in Isolation for the
Indeterminate Future Places Kosilek at a Substantial Risk of Serious
Harm
One tactic for disciplining prisoners is to place them in isolation.
Isolated confinement is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it can be.
As the Supreme Court has noted:
It is perfectly obvious that every decision to remove a
particular inmate from the general prison population
for an indeterminate period could not be characterized
as cruel and unusual. If new conditions of
confinement are not materially different from those
affecting other prisoners, a transfer for the duration of
a prisoner's sentence might be completely
unobjectionable and well within the authority of the
prison administrator. It is equally plain, however, that
the length of confinement cannot be ignored in
deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of
"grue" might be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks or months.12 1
While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
constitutionality of prolonged punitive isolation, it addressed the
issue of prolonged solitary confinement in Hutto v. Finney." In
Hutto, the Court upheld the lower court's decision to place a limit on
the number of days a prisoner could remain in isolation.27 In the
lower court decision, the district court discussed how mental harm
satisfies the first prong of the deliberate indifference test and, in light
of that finding, held that thirty days was the maximum possible period
to keep an inmate in isolation.'" However, the court explained that,
"[i]f at the end of that maximum period, it is found that an inmate
should not be returned to population, he may be kept segregated but
under conditions which are not punitive." 29  The district court
acknowledged the seriousness of the harm that could result from
125. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 278 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th
Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
129. Id.
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leaving an inmate in prolonged isolation, but left an escape hatch for
allowing such isolation when the motivation is not punitive; this will
be significant in analyzing the fourth prong of the deliberate
indifference test.'1"
Isolation lasting longer than thirty days satisfies the first prong
because it puts an inmate at a substantial risk of serious harm.131
Kosilek would remain in isolation for the duration of her sentence,
which would likely be much longer than thirty days.'32 Thus, keeping
Kosilek in isolation for an indeterminate sentence after her surgery
places her at a substantial risk of serious harm and satisfies the first
prong of the deliberate indifference test.
B. Ordering an Injunction Preventing Kosilek From Being Placed in
Isolation Would Be the Only Adequate Treatment
If leaving Kosilek in isolation for a prolonged amount of time
results in serious harm, then the only treatment would be to remove
her from isolation. The only remedy that would prevent
deterioration of her mental health caused by prolonged isolation is an
injunction preventing the DOC from placing Kosilek in isolation for
an indeterminate sentence. That injunction would lead to equally
dangerous harm by placing Kosilek in general population and leaving
her at a high risk of sexual assault.
The DOC would have to either place Kosilek in a women's
facility or create a transgender ward. While those are options, they
are still just natural progressions from the singular remedy of
removing Kosilek from isolation. Just as the court in Kosilek II found
that the only adequate treatment for her gender identity disorder was
sex reassignment surgery but did not prescribe the specific details of
the surgery, so too can the court prohibit prolonged isolation for
Kosilek without prescribing the specific details of which facility she
should be placed in. Thus, an injunction against prolonged isolation
is the only adequate remedy.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. In 2013, Kosilek was only in her early 60s and serving a life sentence. See Kosilek I,
221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Mass. 2002).
133. See supra, notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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C. The DOC Knows of the Risk of Harm to Kosilek If She is Placed in
Prolonged Isolation
This prong of the deliberate indifference test is more
complicated than the first two prongs because of the subjective
element; it is difficult to say precisely what the DOC commissioner
actually knows. However, as the court explained in Kosilek II, the
objective evidence of harm can be so obvious that a finder of fact
could infer that the commissioner had to be aware of the harm.m
A good starting point to determine what Commissioner Dennehy
likely knows is to look at the standards and regulations on prisoner
isolation in Massachusetts. Kosilek is incarcerated at Massachusetts
Correctional Institution-Norfolk, under the DOC's jurisdiction. 135
According to DOC policies, an inmate in isolated protective custody
must have better access to mental health care than inmates in general
population. 13 6  The policy stresses the importance of heightened
mental health care for inmates who have been placed on psychotropic
medication, have a substantial mental health history, or are deemed
to be in crisis.'" This demonstrates a heightened monitoring of the
mental health of isolated prisoners-evidence that Commissioner
Dennehy is aware of a more fragile mental health state for isolated
inmates than those in general population. However, she might not be
aware of the extent of the seriousness of the harm.
Additionally, the policy dictates that any prisoner in isolation has
the status of their confinement reviewed every 120 days and any
administrative isolation is not allowed to last more than ninety days.13
However, there is an emergency clause:
Whenever in the opinion of the commissioner of his
designee, or the superintendent of a state correctional
facility, an emergency exists which requires suspension
of all or part of these regulations, the commissioner of
his designee or the superintendent may authorize such
suspension, provided that any suspension lasting more
134. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 237-38 (D. Mass. 2012).
135. Id. at 213.
136. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECrION, DEPARTMENT PROTECrIVE
CUSTODY UNITS, 103 D.O.C. § 422.03(3)(b) (2013) (mandating weekly mental health
examinations), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/doc/policies/422.pdf.
137. Id.
138. 103 D.O.C. §§ 422.02(1), 422.05(1) (2013).
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than forty-eight (48) hours must be approved by the
* * 139commissioner.
Therefore, barring an emergency, Kosilek should not be kept in
administrative segregation longer than ninety days. Even if
Commissioner Dennehy determines that Kosilek's unique situation
merits placing her in segregation for longer than the ninety-day
maximum, the policy's procedural requirements make it impossible
for the commissioner to be unaware of the prolonged isolation.
Additionally, the procedural safeguards against prolonged isolation
are enough to indicate to the commissioner that there is a significant
risk of harm that could result from such isolation.
There are enough warning signs of the danger of prolonged
isolation available to the commissioner that it is reasonable to assume
that a jury would find the commissioner aware of the potential harm.
D. The DOC Did Not Place Kosilek in Isolation Because of Good
Faith, Reasonable Security Concerns or for Any Other Legitimate
Penological Purpose
Even though the commissioner knows of the significant risk of
serious harm from administrative segregations of indeterminate
lengths, the segregation may be constitutional if it serves a legitimate
penological purpose. The purpose for segregating Kosilek would be
to protect her from harm caused by other inmates. However, the
option to send Kosilek to a women's facility, coupled with Kosilek's
tumultuous relationship with Commissioner Dennehy, indicate that
the decision to place Kosilek in isolation is not made in good faith.
Considering the continual efforts of Commissioner Dennehy, and
the DOC in general, to combat Kosilek's every effort to transition
into a woman,' an assertion of securing Kosilek's safety would be a
pretext for her segregation. The DOC would likely be punishing
Kosilek for the trouble she gave the DOC, or even for being a person
living with gender identity disorder.
A person is typically assigned to either a men's prison or
women's prison based on the policy of the department of corrections
within that jurisdiction.14' Most states look to a person's genitalia
139. 103 D.O.C. § 422.06 (2013).
140. For a detailed discussion of Commissioner Dennehy and the DOC's refusal to
provide treatment for Kosilek, see Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190,238-45 (D. Mass. 2012).
141. Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in
the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 516 (2000).
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when placing her or him in a prison.142 Anyone who disagrees with
their assigned prison may appeal to a judge for a change, but judges
can rely on any relevant information in determining which facility is
appropriate.143 Typically a judge relies on public policy, personal
beliefs, and dictionary definitions.1 44
If one's genitalia is the standard for determining to which facility
to assign an inmate, this further strengthens the argument that
keeping Kosilek in isolation in a men's prions for safety concerns is
pretextual. The typical DOC policy for someone with female
genitalia is to place them in the female prison. The.DOC is actually
creating a danger by keeping Kosilek in isolation in the men's prison.
Transferring Kosilek to a women's facility would eliminate a great
deal of the risk of harm that would result if Kosilek were released
into general population at a men's prison. She would not be as high
of a target for sexual assault at a women's prison because she would
not provide the sole opportunity for heterosexual intercourse-
anatomically speaking.
Transferring Kosilek to a women's facility would essentially
eliminate the risk of harm presented by the men's facility. Because
she would not be as likely a candidate for sexual assault, she would no
longer warrant indefinite segregation. She would no longer be at risk
for physical assault or the deterioration of her mental health from
prolonged isolation. While there is no requirement that the DOC
pick the best method for assuring Kosilek's safety,145 the obvious and
easy solution of sending her to a women's facility constitutes evidence
that the real reason the DOC is keeping Kosilek isolated is unrelated
to her own safety. If the motivation were to ensure her safety, the
DOC would simply send her to a women's facility. Here, it is difficult
to believe that safety is the DOC's real concern, when an alternative
solution is so clearly superior.
For other inmates who receive sex reassignment surgery while
incarcerated, the best way to judge the intentions of an official who
chooses to keep the inmate in solitary confinement will be to look at
142. Id. at 522.
143. Id. at 516.
144. JoAN M. BURDA, GAY, LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER CLIENTS: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE 180-81 (2008).
145. Cf N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 (1979) (finding that the
Transit Authority's blanket policy of refusing to hire anyone using methadone in order to
promote safe drivers might not have been the least restrictive means for achieving that
goal but it was not unconstitutional).
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other post-operative alternatives. Future department of corrections
commissioners might not have as acrimonious a history with the
inmate as Commissioner Dennehy had with Kosilek. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that prisoner safety is a compelling
interest,146 so absent the bad history, future inmates may have
difficulty proving that a commissioner is not acting in good faith. The
best method will be to look at the effectiveness of various solutions.
E. Kosilek's Prolonged Isolation Will Continue in the Future
Although the DOC has not yet said whether the plan for Kosilek
after her surgery will be prolonged isolation, the court should still
proscribe such behavior. As stated previously, Kosilek does not have
to wait to be harmed to seek injunctive relief.147
Furthermore, once Kosilek or any inmate who has received sex
reassignment surgery is placed in prolonged isolation, she is likely to
remain in prolonged isolation well into the future. The reason for
placing the inmate in segregation is to protect her from the general
population, thus she is not part of the general population. The
alternative to isolation is a transfer to another prison, and if that were
the DOC's plan, then there would be no need for an indeterminate
sentence of administrative segregation-the DOC would just send the
inmate to the women's facility.
The entire issue here is whether the DOC can keep a prisoner in
segregation indeterminately. There is no indication that
indeterminate segregation will cease unless an injunction is granted.
IV. Even if Kosilek Does Not Have an Eighth Amendment
Claim Against Prolonged Isolation, She Might Have a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' The Supreme Court has read the Fourteenth Amendment to
mean that when a state action makes economic classification of
individuals, the action must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.149 When the class affected is a discrete or insular minority,
then the state action should be viewed with higher scrutiny than an
146. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005).
147. See Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 250-51 (D. Mass. 2002).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
149. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 591-93.
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action that makes economic classifications.'s A reviewing court must
use strict scrutiny to analyze all racial classifications."' For a state
action to survive strict scrutiny, the state action must be narrowly
tailored to further a real and compelling government interest.'
In Johnson v. California, the plaintiff was an inmate challenging
the California Department of Corrections' ("CDC") policy of
separating new inmates by race for up to sixty days upon their arrival
in the correctional system."'3 The CDC claimed that its policy was
necessary to prevent racial gang violence.'-
The Supreme Court held that the CDC's policy was subject to
strict scrutiny, explaining that even benign racial classifications must
undergo strict scrutiny."' The Court held that though prison security
and discipline constituted compelling state interests, a racial
classification was an inappropriate means of achieving that purpose."'
When a race-neutral means of achieving the goal is available, racial
classification is not sufficiently narrowly tailored."'
If Kosilek finds herself in isolation, her case will be similar to
Johnson's. Both were placed in segregated facilities-Johnson due to
his race and Kosilek due to her transgenderism. In light of Johnson,
the DOC would not be able to keep Kosilek in segregated
confinement if the classification were analyzed under strict scrutiny.
Despite the compelling interest of prison safety, the available
alternative of sending her to a women's prison means that the
administrative segregation is not narrowly tailored. However, the
difference between a classification based on race and one based on
gender can shift the level of scrutiny a reviewing court might give to
such a classification.15
The Supreme Court has given gender classification an
intermediate scrutiny standard-higher than rational basis, but not as
high as the strict scrutiny standard used for racial classifications.'
But Kosilek's altered gender status deviates from the traditional
150. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
151. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
152. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
153. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005).
154. Id. at 502-03.
155. Id. at 505-06.
156. Id. at 513.
157. See id. at 513.
158. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976).
159. See id.
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concept of gender and could call for a different level of scrutiny by
the courts. The Supreme Court classifies certain groupso as
protected classes, deserving of strict scrutiny when they are legislated
against because of the greater public's unfounded biases that the
burdened class is not as worthy or deserving as others." Because
these biases are so popular, the legislature is likely to be affected by
these discriminations so the courts have to view state actions that
might reflect these discriminations with higher scrutiny. Gender
receives an intermediate level of scrutiny because the differences
between men and women can be real and might support some state
action.1
Transgender individuals frequently suffer from discrimination,
and biases they endure are more akin to the unfounded
discrimination against people of a different race, than attributable to
the physical differences between men and women.' They are
harassed in public, attacked, and lose their jobs just for being
transgender or gender non-conforming. These types of
discrimination also result in mistreatment by the government.6  Even
in Kosilek's case, Commissioner Dennehy's denial of treatment was
partially based on her belief that the operation would be politically
unpopular.167
The biases against transgender people are precisely the types of
biases that merit classification as a protected class by the courts. The
biases are unfounded and so popular as to have an effect on
160. These include classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin. City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 440-41.
163. JAMIE M. GRANT, ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 10 (2011).
164. Compare Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 745 n.10 (1982)
(discussing the history of legislative attempts to exclude women from particular areas
simply because legislators believed women were less able than men to perform a particular
function) with Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (noting that "[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality," and that "racial
discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.").
165. Id.
166. In the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, 22 percent of the
respondents were denied equal treatment by a government agency or official, twenty-nine
percent reported police harassment or disrespect, and twelve percent had been denied
equal treatment or harassed by judges or court officials. Id. at 5.
167. Kosilek II,889 F. Supp. 2d 190,247 (D. Mass. 2012).
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legislation. If the courts agree and grant Kosilek and other
transgender Americans status as a protected class, then the DOC's
placing Kosilek in extended isolation should be analyzed under strict
scrutiny standard, which it would not survive. Indefinite segregation
is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Conclusion
Although the court in Kosilek II refrained from discussing
whether it is a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments for
the DOC to place Kosilek in prolonged isolation the issue is ripe.
The Eighth Amendment protects against certain future harm.
Prolonged isolation in general poses a risk to an inmate's mental
health and the indefiniteness of Kosilek's potential isolation would
only add to that harm. The DOC is aware of the risk prolonged
isolation would present to Kosilek's mental health because it has
specific protocol in place to handle the timing of prolonged isolations.
Moving Kosilek to a woman's facility is the only method to resolve
harms of prolonged isolation because removing Kosilek from
isolation and placing her in the general population would place her at
a high risk of sexual violence. Likewise, Kosilek's prolonged isolation
would continue because the alternative of placing her in general
population is untenable. The court should have ordered that as a
component of Kosilek's judgment, the DOC cannot place her in
prolonged isolation and should transfer Kosilek to a woman's facility.
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